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ABSTRACT 
Until recently, regimes governing development occupied definite 
territories that delineated their relevant populations and identified 
authoritative leadership with distinct cultura l boundaries. But 
development regimes today have at best ambiguous territorial moorings. 
Leading participants in the development process engage in rampant 
border crossi ng. Disparate institutions pursue di sparate goals. There is no 
one guiding vision or dominant logic. Confli cts and negotiations over 
control of development underlie contemporary concerns with 
governance. 
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I. DEVELOPMENT REGIMES 
Development ca n be understood as an activity, a condition, an even t, or a 
p rocess. In natural science, it unfolds according to principles that humans do not 
con tro l, but in social science, development is entircly the product of human decisions. In 
social science, developmen t can be bcst understood as a compl ex set of insti rutional 
ac tiv ities that employ pu blic and private assets 10 benefit an entire population. It is a 
re fl exive process wherei n po licies, in sti tution s, outcomes, and analysis intcrac l. It is 
di stinc t fro lll its m allY objects o f th eory and measurement, such as economic g ro\vth. 
The process of development can no l be reduced to any speci fi c set o f policy goals, 
empirical trends, o r no rmative s tatements, fo r it Incl udes the defin ition of goa ls, :5c rting 
of p ri orities, choice of po Li cies, critical refl eClion. debate, relationsh ips ilmong all thc 
peop le who determIne what trends ilrc impon<1nt, and poljtical efforts to change the 
direction of policy. 
\Vhat appears to be o bjectively true about development at any mOmcnt in lime is 
the prod uct of debate, selecti on, and erasu re. ~·lai n s tream and dissenting opinions 
acquire empirical veracity as their contenillng forces generate and deploy ilpp ropnate 
data. The result is a vast Utcra ture on all \'tlfleties of developmen t, using \',UI OUS 
yards ticks. In economic development, for instance, (he aggregate in crease in national 
wealth is a commo n measure of progress; but lliluonal autonomy, food security, equity, 
poverty reduction, and social stability are typica!ly impo rtant poli cy prio rities; and a 
s tate's stabi lity, revenue, military might, and cui rural legi timacy may acrually preoccupy 
develop ment poli cy practice more than economic indicators. Contending fo rccs 
conditio ning developmen t jostle for influence in policy practi ce and usc \'iltlOUS measures 
of success to bo ls ter their positio ns in de\'e1o pmem debates. 
Economi cs and Econolnies 
Economic develo pment is the subject of this essay, and its obJecuve, scientific 
nature seems at first sight to be secure. But th at appearance is deceptive. T here is, most 
fundam entally, a defin itive difference between what is called "the economy" and any 
parti cular "econo my." T he "econo my" studied b~- econo mics consis ts of various m arket 
elements and mechani sm s described in economic theory, but "an economy" includes 
natural endowments, social power, and po litical history, all officially confined by stare 
boundaries that have no place in economic thcory. The " world econo my" in which 
"globali zation" occurs is a kaleidoscopic configuratio n o f national economies, m ost of 
whose operations elude the concep tual field of economi c theory. 
~n1e appli cation of economics to developmen t in any economy requires that 
economi c ideas and empirica l statements be understood by participants in [he 
development process as compelling representations of reality in their own econo my. 
Thus, economic de\'c1opment embraces much more than economics: it includes all (he 
institutio nal and material conditio ns that co nstiun f' economies. M os t criticall y, economic 
develo pment includes the historical processes thro ugh which some particular set o f 
econo mic ideas and empirical statements become compelling to leading participants in 
the development process. 
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Power and Auth o rity 
A develop m ent regim e i ~ an in stitution::!.\ configuration o f effective power over 
huma n behavior and of lcgiul1u.te autho rity to make decisions that implicate w ho le: 
populations. It includes an official sta te apparatus but also much mo re, and as we wi ll 
sec, one single state ca n pacllciparc in va rious regimes. A development regime i nclude~ 
IIlstltuUons of education, research, media, technology, science, and intellectual influence 
lhilt constitu te a development policy main stream . The power and autho rity of a regim e: 
resides not only in government but also in physical in struments o f power over nature tlnc 
in (U i lUCtl\ in strumen ts of Ilutho rity over people's minds and morality. It is a techn o-
regIme WIth a discursive regimen. 
Composed of self-conscio us, reflecllve, aruculate people who work in specific 
contexts to rurect the development process, a developmelll regi me IS a documentec 
histOriC formation. Its orgal1lzed influen ce genera tes ideas and empi n cal knowledge th :1 ° 
are most com pelling for leadmg particqnnrs in the process of dc\oelopment in particul ar 
places and times. The history o f dc\"clop ment thus centers on regimes Lilat chitr· 
tr::tjcctorics of developmcnt from the past to the present and into the future. 1 
II. AN IM P E RIAL REGIM E 
J n South Asia, pre-modern regimes developed regIOnal econ omies fo r man ~ 
centUrle5, bu t th e first devel opmen t regime emerged lInder th e British Empire after 1 8~ O 
Built upon conquered regions, South Asiit's first development regime subordinatec 
conquered regio nal econo mics to ilTIpcrial designs of globalization . 
In 1929, one erudite British agncultural officer, \, '''ham fYloreiand, concludec 
from hiS resetlrch that th e "Ioea of agricu ltu ra l de\"clopment was already present 10 (ht 
fourteenth century." I Its conclusIOn C:1n now be ex rended much furrher back in timeo 
because now we kn ow th::tt ancient and medieval rulers in South :\ sia invested he:1vi ly tC 
increasc productivi ty, most visibly by building irriga tion , roads, and cities. By th ( 
eighteenth century, s tate invesun cn ts had helped to develop agriculture, commerce, anc 
manufa cturing most rem arkably around capir:1l cities in Bengal, Gujarat, Indo-Gangetic 
plains, and peninsular river basi ns . .2 
Pre-modern regimes endeavored to increase Slate reycnue in p o litical and SOCii 
environments unfavorable {Q modern goals of developmem, because military ane 
poliucal st ruggles often destroyed investments in farming, manufacturing, and banking.· 
Though pre ~ modern s tates did accomplish economic development in their day, they were 
certainly not o rganized around the process o f developmen t in the mo dern sense of that 
term, because their efforts focll sed speCifically o n ruling elites. 
I David Ludden, "Ind ia's Development Regime." In Colonialism and Cultllre . Ed ited by 
Nicholas Dirks, Ann Arbor: Un ivers ity of Michigan Press, 1992, pp .247-87. 
2 Tapan Rayehaudhuri and Irfan Hab ib. Editors. The Cambridge Economic History of Ilidia . 
VoU circa c. I 200-c.17 50. Cambridge: Cambridge Universi ty Press, 1970 . Irfan Habib. 
All AlIas of Mug/wI Empire: Political alld Ecollomic Maps Wilh No tes, Bibliography 
alld Index . Delhi : O xford University Press, 1982. 
3 William Moreland , Th e Agrarian Syslem of Moslem Illdia, Cambridge, 1929 (reprint DeIhL 
1968) , pp .20S-6 . 
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The modern idea of economic development to increase the wealth of whole 
populations spread around the world in the nineteenth century. Its referent population 
was then, and still remains, the nation. One key early text was Adam Smith's IPea/l/) of 
NatiollS, published in 1776, which attacked Crown support fo r elitist monopolies like the 
East India Company and promoted commerce to benefit the whole nation . 
The British nation came into being during the imperial expansion of Crown 
authority overseas. British conques t in South Asia was underway in Adam Smith 's day 
and continued to the late nine teenth century. At the same time, Britain became the 
world's foremost industrial nation. British India became an official collection of regions 
in the world-economy of British imperialism. The British Empire organized a 
development regime that embraced Britain, British India, and also Ceylon and other 
colonial terriw[ies, all of which became distinctly natio nal segments of an imperial design 
whose legacy is still with us today. 
T he Business o f E mpi[e 
By 1793, debates had begun in Britain about managing Britain 's "A ~ i a ti c 
possessio ns" in rhe national interest, something Adam Smith never con sidered.-l Two 
basic principles emerged . First, empire must pay for itself. The East India Compam· fell 
afoul of this principle, forcing Parliamen t to assume direcl control over Indian finance. 
Secondlv, British business had to benefit. The Company ceased to serve thi s purpose 
adequately and imperial policy shifted onto laissez faire lines. In 1813, Parliament ended 
the Company's monopoly to allow private merchants freer access [Q British rerri lO ries 
overseas. In 1833, Britain opened India further by making English ,he official language 
o f state law, admini stration, and education.; 
The administrative articulation of Empire with British business interests moved 
ahead no ticeably in 1833, when the aboli tion of slavery triggered petitions from 
Caribbean sugar planters, who being deprived of slave labor, spurred the Indian 
government to send shiploads of indentured workers from Calcuna to English sugar 
plantations in the "·est Indies. By 1833, tariffs against Indian cloth were protecting 
Lancashire industrialists, who sent clo th virtually free of tariff to British India, dri\-ing 
countless weavers into destitution. English merchants sold Bengal opium in China lO buy 
teacups and tea for English housewives and factory workers to sweeten with sugar from 
Caribbean plantations. Meanwhile, E nglish businessmen came more often to work in 
India and displaced In dians from commercial partnerships wi th Brirish firms, as India 's 
overseas trade moved more and more into British hands. 
All this did not constitute a development regime, however. Building one began 
during decades from 1823 to 1854, when the real value of taxes in British India rose 
rapidly, as prices in India dropped steadily. During this long price depression, it became 
more cost effective to invest Indian taxes in lnclia, where they could buy more than if 
remitted to England. At the same time, British businesses sought ways to invest state 
4 Historical View of Plans for the Government of British India and Regulation of Tra de la the 
East Indies and Outlines of a Plan of Foreign Government, a/Commercial Economy. 
and of Domestic Adminislration for the Asiatic Interests afGreat Britain. London, 
J .Sewell and J . Debrett, 1793. 
' Will iam Barber, Brilish Econamic Thought and India 1600-1858: A Srlldy in the Hisrory of 
Development Econom ics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975. 
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moncy overseas ro Improve the supp ly of raw materials and consumer goods. Thus In the 
18405. government began buildi ng infrastructure In British india to cheapen Impo rts and 
exports, to expand military operation s, to in crease rc\ocnue, and to extend the field of 
BflU:-; h private capltal 1l1 vcstmcn t. 
So began the promotion of state infrastructure inve ~ tmcnt s in economic 
dcvelopment. It focused first on plantalions, railways, cities, roads, POrtS, shipping, and 
irrigation, In rhe 18405, an irnga tio n engineer, Arthur Cotton, led the way by arguing thtH 
In dian crop produ ction cou ld lncrCtt se many fold with state irrigation that would pay for 
Itself with higher taxes o n more valuable land," At the same tim e, Parliament sought 
ways to increase cotton suppues to Lancashire so as to reduce England's dependence on 
Ihe AmerICan South. Romba~ PreS idency attracted special attention, alo ng with Egypt.-
T he pion worked: when the L'S C iy li War broke out, in 18(,0. Egypt and BombaI' 
PreSIdency lilled Ihe "OId 111 COlton supplies created by the Unio n blocbdc of 
Confederale ports, Globil hzall'Jn had begun. 
G lobali za ti on and Development 
A dC"cl0rment [eg"ne hod emerged in Soulh Asia br 1880, and 11 fcd the first 
hi storic round of economiC glo bahzaoon. In 1853, Governor Gel1cr~l Dalhousie 
ilnnounccd a plan to budd iln Indian railway with state contracts th at guaranteed English 
compa nies a minimum five percent reru m ; and to secure that return, government kepl 
control o f railway construction and management. In 1871, the Govern m ent of Indla 
obtained aurhorlty to raIse loans for productive purposes, and large irrigatio n pro)cC[s 
began, follo\\1ng earuer success raislllg revenues from small pro jects. Infraslrucmre 
projects were all gO\'ernmel1t wo rks fun ded by Indian taxes, which employed nau\'c 
con trac tors, 3nd their benefir ::: also filtered down to native landowners who produced 
commodity crops for cxpandmg market ;;, 
By 1880, three bilSic modern dc\'e! opmelll Ideas were well es tabbshed. First and 
foremost was the idcl\ that the s ta le would lead dc\'elopment. Secondly. maj o r stare 
Investments III IIlfraStrllcture would boost private in vesunent. expand and Integrate 
Illtlrkcts, accelerate economic growth, enrich the state, and benetit w hole populauo ns. 
Third, state-led economic progress would benefit " the poor," who for example were to 
be prorected from famine by large irngaoon works, The 1876 famines in Bnti sh IndIa 
made the sDte in sistence tha t Its de\'elopment work benefited the poor all the m ore 
compulsory. 
Imperia! market int egralio n spawned regIOns of specialized commercial 
production :l.round the I ndiilll Ocean , Ceylon \Vas a plantation ecoll omy, Co ffee 
plantations expanded from fi(n ' to eighty thousand acres bcnveen 1847 and 1857, and 
reasants de\"Oted onolher forn'-eight thous>nd acres to coffee for export. Co ffee acreage 
expanded another 35,000 oeres in the I 860s. In the 18805, leaf disease killed coffee 
cultiva tio n, \\'hich was rapidly replaced by tea, rubber, cocoanut, and cinchona, British-
owned plantations in Ceylo n and Assam (including S),lhet) replaced C hina as the malor 
b Arthur Thomas Cotton, Lectures on irrigation works ill India; delivered atlhe School of 
A1ilitary EngineerIllg, Charham, GUflmll1 sessioll, 1874. by Arthur COIlOII . Collected and 
Published by Uddaraj u Raman, Vijayawada, 1968. 
7 Briti sh Parhamentary Papers. ReporlsjrollI COlli 111 illees. 1847-1848. Volu me 9. "Report 
from the Select Committee 0 11 the Cultivat ion of Cotton in India." 
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suppliers of English tea. British investors evenn,ally drove out most peastlnt planltltion 
crop producers and controlled export mtlrkcts. 
Labor suppli es posed the major constraint for plantations, and the solutio n was 
fo und in (evenrually permanent) labor migration . Tea plan ters depended on labor 
migrat..ion from southern Tam il districts into Ceylon and from north ern Inclia into 
Assam. British plantations in Malay colonies likewise depended on migratory Tamil 
wo rkers. By 1880, the modern age o f vast labor migration to major sites o f capital 
investment had begun. 
The mobility of commodi ties, labo r, and capital, whi ch now goes under the nam e 
"globalIzation" in creased mo re berwcen 1870 and 1914 than ever before; and more, in 
fac l, than ever since. Globalization sin ce 1990 is the second hi storic round, whose 
maglll nide has yet to surpass the first. By 1900, dista nt lands arou nd th e Indian O cean --
from the ~liddle East and East :\frica to South and Southeast Asia - had become 
extenSl\'e! \' attached. Many o f those antlchmems broke after 1945 , and most have ref to 
be res[Qred, wh ile the Middle East connection has ::tlone expanded. 
B,' 1900, British Burma and East A frica developed within cirCUits of mobtliry 
anchored III British India. ]n Burma, Tamil Chettiyar bankers finan ced agnculrural 
expan sion 111 rhe T rrawaddy River delra, which generared huge exports o f rice for world 
markers, inclucli ng Inclia , where urbanization IIlcreased demand for impo[(ed rice. In 
East and South .\fri ca, merchants from G ujarat and workers from Bombay, Ctllcuna, and 
Madras pro\'ided labo r and capital for railway constrllctio n, fo rming urba n nuclei for 
modern economics . Between 1896 and 1928, 850/0 of the emigran ts lea\'ing Indian pon s 
went to work o n plantations in Ceylon, Malaya, the Cari bbean, Fiji and ~ lauriuu s. 
Regions o f D eve lopme nt 
Regional economIC speciatization, based on consciously targeted capiml 
investmenr and state-organized labor mo biliry became a hallmark of the national 
economies that em erged in Sou th .\ sia during this first round of globalization. Though 
regional specialization is most visible in plantarion and m_ining regions, it embraced rhe 
enUre subcon ti nent. 
Globalization before 1920 ga\'e economic regions in South Asia a rusunct export-
o ri en tation, which faded in the first decades afrer 1947, bur returned \vilh a vengeance 
during rhe second great burst of globalization, afrer 1980. ln 19 14, almost all goods 
arriving at South Asia po rts were destined for export: these were mos tl~ · cotton, whcat , 
ri cc, coal, coke, jute, gunny bags, hides and skin s, tea, orcs, and wool. Most cotto n came 
to Bomba\' from Mahara shtra . All rea came to Calcutta and Colo mbo fro m Assam, 
Darjecling, and Ceylon. Most export rice came (Q Rangoon . \'\fheat came primarily from 
fields undcr state irrigation in Punjab and western United Provinces (U ttar Pradesh). 
O ilseeds came to Bombay from Hrderabad territo ry (Andhra Pradesh), the Cenual 
Provinces (l\ !adhya Pradesh), and Bombay Presidency (Maharashua) . Coal , coke, and 
ores came from mines around Jharkhand into Calcutta and Bo mbay. Eastern Bengal 
(Bangladesh) produced almost all the world's jute. 
The fi rs t decades of globalization also produced indusrrializa ti on in Briti sh India. 
Imported industrial machinery was rapidly domesticated in new Indian factory towns. 
The first Indian cotton mill had appea red in 1853 in Bombay. T he Factory Act (1881) 
imposed working rules o n Indian factories to reduce comparative advantages they 
enjoyed in \·irtue of low local labor costs and cheap raw materia ls. T he impetus behind 
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the Factory Act sounds famlliar today, as western countries endeavor to nll se compliance 
with International standard s among industrial competitors in ;\ sia . 
But the Factory Act did not suppress Industrialization in British India . In 1887, 
IN .Ta ta's Empress Mill arose at Nagpur, tn the hea rt of cotton country, and the Tatas 
became India's industrial dyna sty. Tara Iro n and Steel Works at Jamshedpur consum ed 
In creas ing supplies of o re and coal, whi ch by the 1920s rivaled exports from Calcutta . In 
19 14, India was the world's fou rth largest industrial cotron textile producer: corton mills 
numbered 27 1 and employed 260,000 people, 42% in Bombay city, 26% elsewhere in 
Bombay PreSidency (m os tly Nagpur), and 32% elsewhere In Britl sh India, at m~l.J 0 r 
railway ju nctures. Coal, iron, steel, jute and other It1dustries were develo ped ar the same 
Unle, producing specialized reglolui conccntra uons of heavy industrIal production 
around Bom bay, :\hmcdabad, l\:agpur, Kanpur, Calcutta, Jamshed pur, and Madras. M In 
19 13. manufactured goods comprised twenty percent of Indian expo rts, \'alued at ten 
percent of national income, figure s never surpassed 
In 19 14 , war stimulated policies ro enhance J ndia's Industnali za tio n ro make IndIa 
less dependeI1t on Imports; and the Great D epression, 1929- 1933, again boosted 
inccnuves fo r Indu strial g rowth by redu cing prices for farm output compared ro 
manufactures. .As a result, industrial OUlpu t in Brlfish I ndla grew steadt ly from 19 13 (0 
1938 and \vas 58% higher in 1936 than in 19 14, compa red to slower, more uneven ralC:; 
of growth 111 the UK and Germany.' 
A National Econom y 
By t 920, British I ndla was a national eCono m \' WIth ItS own dlstincti\>e 
l11S11lUUons and material conditions. Though domina ted by agnculture, it included a large 
pubhc sector and major indust nes. Native investors and I1{lUo nalist po liticians were by 
thiS arne vocal advocates for increasing state develo pment effo rts. By 1920, Briti sh India 
was also a land of opportu ni ty for global investors, and the lS Consul at Bombay, Hen,,· 
Baker, called it "one of the few large countries of the world where there is an 'open door' 
for the trade of all countries."111 England was sti ll British India's dOlTIlIlant trading 
partner, but losi ng ground. In 19 14, the UK sent 63% of British India's imports and 
receiyed 25% of its exports; and by 1926, these figure, stood at 51". and 21%, 
respectively. By 1926, total trade with the UK averaged 32·'. for the fi\-e major pons 
(Calcutta , Bomba)" Madras, Karachi, and Rangoon). Bombar and Rangoon did 43% of 
their overseas business with ASia and the Middle East. C:llcuna did a quarter of it s 
business Wi th America." 
, Deportment of Statistics, Government of India, [lI lalld Trade (Rail alld River-borne) oj 
Illdia. 1919-1920, Calcutta, 192t. 
9 Morris D. Morris, "TIle Growth of Large-Scale Industry to 1947 ," in The Cambridge 
Economic Histol)' oJlndia. \'olllllle fI, c. 175 7-c 1970, Dhamla Kumar, ed itor, Cambridge. 
1983. 
10 US Department of Commerce, Special Consular Reports, No.72, British [n dia. witli notes 
on Ceylon. AJghaniston, and Tibet , Washi ngton, Government Printing O ffi ce, 1915 , p.9. 
11 Al/lll1al Statement oJthe Sea-Borlle Trade of British India wilh fire British Empire Gild 
Foreign Countries Jor the fiscal year eliding 31st March. 1926, Calcutta , Government of 
India, 1926, Table 10. 
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South A sia's early twentieth century globalization al so appears in migration data. 
In 191 1, the British in British India numbered only 62% of all resident European s. Four 
times more immigrants came into British India from other parts of A sia than from 
Europe; seven of ten came overl and fro m Nepal (54%) and Afghanistan (16%). In 1911 , 
Nepalis entering British India (280,248) exceeded the resident British population by fifty 
percent; and overall ) ,\ sian immigrants were three times as many. In addition, br 1921 , 
emigrati on far exceeded immigration. Between 1896 and 1928, 83% of 1,206,000 
emigran ts left British India from Madras (which accounted for only 10% o f total 
overseas trade), and th ey mos tly went to work in Ceylon (54%) and Malaya (39%). 
Bombay emigrants went mos tly [Q East and South A frica; Cal cutta emigrants, to Fiji and 
the \X1est Indies .12 
In 1920, Britain still controlled th e highes t echelons of South Asia 's poli tical 
economy, but by th en, the overall process of capital accuIT'lUl atio n in side South Asia had 
escaped British control. Before th e First World War, London's political pos ition in 
South Asia seem ed secure. t\fter the war, Londo n's power declined vi sibly, both in 
relation [Q o ther imperial natio ns and in relation to na uonalist fo rces in Sou th _~ :=; i a, 
wh ich mobilized then on an unprecedented scale to wrest contro l o f thei r nati onal 
development from the British. 
Il l. NATIONAL REGIMES 
In th e 1920s, a national develo pment regime emerged in side Bri t.ish Indi a. In 
1920, th e Indian government o btained financial auton om~- fro m Britain . N atio nalist 
forces focu sed th eir critique o f government sharply o n econo mic issues. The Indian 
Natio nal Congress had first met in Bo mbay, in 1885, and then met every yea r in late 
December in a different city o f British India. Following the great Deccan fa mines, in 
1879, Dadabhai Naoroji pubUshed his influential Tbe PO/:" 1J of ["dia to document ,he 
nega tive eco nomic impact o f imperial policies on India. It was, in effect, a natio nalist 
revision o f Adam Smi th , with even greater impact, because of its political location. 
Naoroji presided at Congress meetings in 1886, 1893, and 1906, where delegates from all 
the provinces discu ssed government policy and argued for lower taxes and increased 
state development expenditure. In 1905 , the Congress launched a Swadeshi ivfovement 
to induce Indian consumers to buy Indian made clo th rather than British imports. 
Econo mic nationalism was born . 1.1 
Pe rils of Globalization 
In the 1930s, the Great Depression dramatized bel"Ond doubt perils imposed on 
a natio n when its econ omy is open wide to the wo rld economy under ilTIperial managers. 
D epression sparked peasanr and worker's movements demanding economic securi ty, and 
it spurred nationalist efforts to make government accountable to the nation . By (his 
dl11e, government had long experience as economic manager and im'csror in 
infrastruc ture. Government owned and managed most mineral and forest resources. 
" A Historical Atlas of South Asia, Joseph E. Schwartzberg, editor, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1978, p. I 15. 
I) Bipan Chandra, The Rise olld Growth of Economic Na tionalism in [ndio: Ecollolllic 
Policies of In dian Natiollal Leadership. New Delhi : Peop le's Publishing House, 1966. 
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Government agricultural departments, colleges, and experiment s taLi ons supported 
scientIsts and engi neers who worked on state- fu nded development p rojects. Yct the vast 
state secror of the imperial economy was ma naged within a Ialssez/aire, frec-ma rket policy 
fnunework that favoured big investors and delivered benefits disproportionately to 
foreigners. 
During the 19305, nauonalists concluded from empirical data interp reted with 
main stream nationali st economic ideas that a laissezfaire frec-market development regime 
dI scriminated against politically subo rdinate regions, which enriched im perial nat ions by 
pro vIding their IIlvCslors profits, and their consumers, cheap raw materials and consumer 
goods. Il avmg reached thi s conciu slo n, national leaders dcn sed new ambition s for 
development. In 1931, jawaharlal Nehru push ed economic tho ught in it new direClion 
by saying, "the great poverty and misery of the Indian People are duc, no t only to foreign 
explonation m Indla but also to the economic structure of SOCIC~' , which the alien rule rs 
SUppO rl so that {hclI" cxploital1on may continue." li e WCIlI o n to prOciallTI, "In order 
th erefo re to remove thiS poven y and miscry and to all1cl! () r ~He the condilion o f the 
masses, It is essentlal W Illake revolutionllry changes In the present econOffilC and social 
f d I . I "I' struclUre a society an to remove t lC gross IIlcqua ltle s. 
Plan ni ng Regim es 
The 1930s and 19405 b rought peoples of South As" as bmer an experience 0 1' 
state failure as any population has ever endured, including mass suffering, det\th, and 
di slocll.no n during the Great Depression , Bengal Famine. and Partition . Dl sastrou:, 
experience of imperial governance IIlduccd leading naoonah 5t5 to lay groundwo rk fo r 
nllu onall y planned econ omic development that stressed aurollomy. security, and natio nal 
lI1tcgraoon under strong cen tral s tate leadership . In 1951, Pnme !\unister Nehru chaired 
I ndia's Planning Commission, and in the 1950s, all South ASian countries wrote national 
plans stressing sdf-sufficlency and addressing problems of nauonal economic growth. 
poverty, and inequality . 
The twenty-five rears between 1950 and 1975 were [he heyday of nationall\' 
pi;'II1ned development in SOllth Asia . Uniquely in Bangladesh, however, Independence 
ar[lvcd only 111 1971, and until then, Its Pakjstan regime rejectcd legitimate demands for 
regIOnal development in East Pakistan. Though Pakista n stancd national dc\-e1opment in 
what becamc Bangladesh , it also deLiycred intensely discriminatOry, uneven development. 
which spawned mass discontent, upheaval, and eventually, brutal war. In 1971. 
13anglades h emerged determined to pursue p rogressive, planned national development 
fo r <111 citizens. 
Notably for Bangladesh, bUI to some degree for all post-colonial regimes. 
national planning faced serious cons traints: fi nancial, in fra structu ral, admin istrative. 
political , and inrcllectual. .-\ll these \verc qui te severe in Ba ngladesh . The imperial regime 
had str<lnded ,his region on outer margin s of public and privatc priorities .. -\ dministrative 
and JudJclal systems, transport and educational in frastructure, and fi nancial resources 
wcre noto riously weak, compared to other parts of British India. To address these 
weaknesses, Lord C urzon established the Province of East Bengal and Assam, in 1905. 
but this innovation dlcd in 1911, under nationalist pressure. Regional developmenl 
remained subordinate and marginal under both impcrial and early n a tional regimes. Raw 
" A. Main Zaid i. editor, A Tlyst With DestillY: A study of econolllie policy resolutions of the 
Indian Na /iol/al COl/gress passed dllrillg the last 100 years. "ew De lh i, 1985, p.54. 
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materinls, zamindar rents, interest payments, tax revenues, and p lantation and Industrial 
profits m o,'ed sys tem aticalh' ou t o f eastern Benga l to enrich Calcutta, Delhi, Lo ndon, 
and Islamabad; while the inflow of public an d private iln-esrment was minimal. Im perial 
development had designed all dependent regions to sen -e do minant, metropoli tan 
regions, but compa ratively large public and private investments had no neth eless fl o\ved 
into favo ured regio ns o f Bri ti sh India, particularly the western Ganga basin and Punjab.1; 
During th e heyday o f planning, systematic inegualities in wealth and power 
among social g roup s and regio ns remained starkly visible in developmen t thinking. The 
Bangladesh freedo m struggle dramatized in equalities, which al so became pro minent In 
J ndia, Sri Lanka, and (\X 'es r) Paki stan. Planning regimes mckl ed inequalities with 
admini strati\-e and legal act.ion, suppo rted by the burgeo ning academic fi eld o f 
"devel opment s tudies," endowed in these decades wi th poliCY-Oriented research centres 
focused o n development in nati ons emerging from impenal regi mes. In post-colo nial 
counLries, the po li tical character o f development -- and the necessiry of changing power 
relations in order to redesign developmen t regimes, to sen-e natio nal citizens -- pcrvllded 
mai nstream development thought. 
In that hi storic context, developmenl theory and practice converged o n plann ing, 
whose goal \\-a5 to re-ori ent dev elopment toward natio nal pnorities. Imperial regimes had 
turned resou rces of subordi nate regio ns into objects fo r /OIur~fai"': lI 11 ocatio n by m arkets 
In the world econo my. National planning sepa rated nation?J and glo bal market prio riuc:;, 
cnclosing national economies and instituting s[ate redis tribuu\-c sys tem s to make na tion:tl 
markets sen'c national citizens. 1(, 
ivlos{ natio nal regimes around the world became mo re self-contained in the 
1950s and 1960s. Traumas fo llo wing the first great burst o f globaliza tio n made moS[ 
national regimes more inward looking and self-protecti\-e. Forcign direct investment 
(FDI) decl ined globally from roughly ten percent o f world output in 1913 to less than 
five percen t in th e 19605, when the rate of in crease in world m erchandise ex ports 
remained weU below the 1.7 percen t that pertained from 18- 0 to 19 14, 
In South Asill, as elsewhere, natio nal p lans focused o n national markets. 
Plllnners de\-ised prio rities for allocating public and private resources, acquired internlllly 
and externally. External funding came in grants and loan:; directly from countries {hilt 
sought to ,,;eld influence in former imperial dependenCies, and indireccly from Ihe 
richest countries, for the same reason, through Bretto n W'oods institutions, the \'<Iorld 
Bank and International Mo netary Fund (IMF). Among rich countries, th e United Stales 
became the IllOSt aggressively expan sive. 
Fo llowing the basic working principles of their irnpcrial predecesso r, national 
planning regimes in South _-\sia s trove to enhance and supplem ent private investm ent. 
They were no t anti-market, but rather, pro-natio nal marker. Planning instituted a 
combined public-priva te apparatus for mo ni wring and managing national economies. 
Planning agencies organized initiatives like cooperati\-e societies and community 
developmem program s. Governmems set up public food procurement and distribution 
sys tems to control food costs. They expanded nationlll health and education. Th ey 
" Agricul/ural Produc /ioll alld Sou /I! Asian His/Of)" edited by David Ludden , Preface to the 
second edition (Delhi : Oxford Universi ty Press, 2005) , pp, vii - xxiv, 
lOGunnar Myrdal , Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty a/Nations. NY: Random House, 
1968 , 
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added to Inhented portfolIos of s lale-owned assets and enterpri ses heavy industries, 
public utJlJljcs, banks, and Insurance. 17 
IV. RE GIME CHANGE 
DUring the h eyday of national pla nning, economic progress became a central 
feature of national li fe . Public intellecnlals and o rganizations represen ting farmers, 
workers, businesses, and mallY other economic interes ts became IIltenseiy involved III 
development debates. Public inte rest groups of all kinds mobi lized thelllseives poli tically. 
As In earher nationalist times, econ o miC self-i nte rest preoccupied urban middle classes, 
whIch became more populous, diverse, and politically acrive. 
To address development demands pressed by all these groups, nauonal politicians 
deployed deficit spending, which increased thei r need fo r external funding. Internation al 
and bilateral funding agcncics, as well as national donors and lenders, thereby obtained 
more Ic\'cragc: o n post-coloJ1lal national economies. FunJlI1g needs and national pride 
pushed polluclalls in South Asia to em phasize economic growth, so that increaSing 
nauonal wealth per capita became an end 111 Itself, which turned policy priorities toward 
the lIlterests of investors of ::Ill kjnds, as competitive poli tics pushed governments to 
undenake huger projects demanding more external fi nance. 
Pragm a ti c Stra teg ies 
\\'hlle In theory, expanding popular political parucipauon would favour the 
inclusion of :dl citizen interests in the develop ment p rocess, in fact and in prac tice, 
finan cial pre!<sures to meet citizen demands m ade governments more dependent on 
people With money to invest in dc\"(~lopll1en t. Launched in the 19605, the G rcell 
Revolution represents a s trategic amalgamation of these contcndjng forces, for on th e 
one hand, being based o n the inte nSl\'e use of pesticides, fertilizer, tractors, tube wells. 
and high-yleJdlflg hybrid seeds , it fayoured investors in agriculrure and indus try, and o n 
the other hand, because it raised wheat and rice yields tremendously, l( secured basic 
food requirements for natio nal populations and spread benefits widely, though u neven ly. 
Green Revolu tion provided a strategIC blueprin t for national develo pmen t by 
cncouraglJlg regimes to ( I) increase naDonal weal th and security b,' (2) sp readi ng ne,,· 
produc ti"e technologies (3) with the help of lavish state subsidies that (~) favour richer 
investors, (5) so as to generate more p rivate investment and (6) bnng p roducers 
throughout n.lOonai economics into more wealth-productive system s of combined state-
and-market a~5et allocati on . 
J7 Allliya KUIll", Bagchi , "Development Planning" In The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of 
ECOIIOlll ics, editors Murray Mil gate and Peter Newman John Eatwell. London: 1989. 
Pranab Bardhan, The Political ECOII OIII), of Development in India. Bombav: De lhi Ox ford 
University Press, 1984 . Pramit Chaudhuri , India's Economy: Poverty Gnd Development. 
New York : Sl. Martin's Press, 1979 . Franc ine R. Frankel, IlIdia's Political Economy, 
194 7- /9 7-: The Gradllal Revolution. Pri nceton: Princeto n Uni versity Press, 1978. Rajn l 
Kothari, The Political Ecollomy of De, ·eloplIlelll . Bombay: Orient Longman, 197 1. 
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Sou th As ian planning regimes substantially reo rga nized marker econo mies in side 
their borders. This activity was in tune with develo pm ent thinking, which suppo rted land 
reform and redistributive policies to favour disadva ntaged groups. D evel opment th eory 
also suppo rted industrial impo rt substitutio n and th e productio n o f many basic goods 
and services, incl uding transpo rtation, energy, banki ng and insurance, in public sector 
enterprises. Yet in theo ry and practice, national economies remained predomi nan tly 
market-o riented, mos tly under private contro l. Private enterprise s ti ll domin ated 
agri cu lture and industry. Even in India, where national planning had th e larges t impact, 
eighty-percent o f indu strial production remained in the priva te secmr, where pub lic 
ou tput lowered input prices. The result was slow economic growth and visible progress 
in shifting develo pmenr benefi ts w ward gro ups that would no t have ben e fi ted as much 
from Cree-market allocation in post-colo nial economic conditions, especia lly fa rmers, 
industria l workers, an d big busin ess. lit 
Unp lanned Proble m s 
RegulalOry 51'stems esta bli shed undet p lanning regimes also pushed nauonal 
markets in unfo reseen directio ns, wh ich became coun terproduc ti ve. rvrost nO lably, 
bureaucratic controls o n imports, exports, and business generally spawned co rruption as 
well as black and grey markets. Foreign exchange sho rtages put priva lE: and public secmr 
compa nies into financial competi tion, driving pro fit seekers un dergrou nd. O ne es timate 
I)ut the valu e o f India 's black market at nearly half GD P in the la te 19705. 
In additio n, political pragmati sm mixed develo pment admini str,uion with poliucal 
pat ronage. This sparked o ppositio n fro m gro ups left o ut of the pa tro nage circuit, 
dep rived of development benefits. In th e 1970s, th is o pposition becam e yolatile 111 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, and Sri La nka . Charges of co rrupt, in effi Cient, domi necOlng 
and discrimin atory sta te development practi ces became effective weapons in compeu:I\'e 
poli tics. By the late 19705, leacling and aspiri ng participants in national regimes cla,hed 
openly over contro l o f development. Bu reaucrats, po liticians, the military, do mc;; tic 
inves to rs, and interna tio nal financiers were tearing at th e fabric of natio nal planr ..lI1g 
regimes. 
Trans iti onal D ecades 
In retrospec t, we see a transfo rmatio n in natio nal regim es that began in the late 
1960$ and )~elded new development regimes by 1990 . The transitio n began slowly, !'oon 
after Nehru's death , in 1964, when famines struck Inclia, in 1967. Bangladesh 
independence gain ed po li tical force at the same time, and then in 1974, famine hit 
Bangladesh. In bo th fami ne times, foreign aid became cri tical , and in respo nse, national 
regimes put new energy in to the Green Revolution . Plan ners concentrated o n inve~ung 
state fun ds in sites o f intensive cultivation, where well-endowed landowners controUed 
local labour, fi nance, and politi cal institutions. Critics called this strategy "berring on the 
rich." D efenders called it the o nly road to national food securi ty. 
18 B. R. Tomlinson, Th e New Cambridge History of India: The Economy ~r Modem Indio. 
1860-1970. New Delhi : Foundation Books, 1997. Johnson, B. L. C. Developmen t in 
SO ll th Asia . Hannondsworth, England: Penguin, 1983 . 
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This Stf<1tcgic blueprint led states to adopt development plans that called for 
In creas ingly expens ive investments, which dcm<lndcd m ore external fimlll ce, m o re "nd 
more in the form of debt. At the sa me ume, the \'\Iorld Bank dramatica lly Increased its 
lCilcUng under Robert MeN amara, who led the charge to increase developmenr loan s and 
aid from rich countries and private banks. These new loans ca me with new conditions, 
collectively called structural adjustment programs, which began in the 19705, and gained 
rorce and reach in the 19805 and 19905. Under these programs, the World Bank and 
IMF demanded that borrowing governments drastically reduce their regulatory and 
provisioning ro le In their econom ies, to assume the role of supporter and ftlcilitator for 
pnvate Inves to rs, who would , according to emerging m~ins lre~m economiC thought 
under the so -ca ll ed \'\/ashington Consen sus, engage r<ltio nally in m<lrket acuvity to 
allocate resources most efficiently fo r th e in cre<lsc o f national wealth . Freeing m<lrkets 
fro m state control bcc<llllc thc mantf<l o f the intcrnauonal dc\-e!o pmcnt main Stream . I') 
Planmng regimcs unravelled under structural adjustment. Sri Lanka. Bangladesh, 
and Nepal led the way in South Asia, starling slowly in the 19705 and accelerating in the 
19805. \Vnh declining relative prices for prlmary product exports, the burden of external 
debt grew hCltner, w hil e rltlsing fund s for large dC\'e!opment proJects, epiwm lzed by the 
f\ 1ahaveil scheme In Sri Lltnka, then thc la rgest irrigation pro ject in the \\'orld, became 
more press ing .\t the S<lme time, rising o il prices brought Europe and l"onh Amen ca 
recession, Infhuon , and pcrro-dollars in need of clrcullttion , while they brought South 
,\ sla higher costs fo r industrial g rowth, middle class consumption, and the G reen 
Revolution . TIle smaller countries first began bo rrowing on a much larger scale and 
succumbed qUickly and decisively to structural adjustment. In 1981 , Indi a began to rely 
rore.gn debt, and b)' 199 1, internal and external pressures had fo rced econo m ic 
IIberaUzatJon. I n the 19805, nco-liberal rree-marke. orthodoX'· conquered the economic 
mainstream, where harsh critics of state planning, provi5io11lng, and reg ulauon beco me 
most influential. Development st rategies emphasized pri\'ate sector leadership In market-
driven economiC growth, emphaSized imports and exports, and shi fted {he balance of 
power in nauonal state-and-m arket asser allocation toward national and IIlternationai 
business il1tefes[s .~l1 
v. THE GOVERNANCE CONUNDRUM 
Development reglmes in Sou th ASia o perate to day inSide the same naaonal sta res 
that managed [hem in 1975. But today's regimes are fundamentally dirferent. and .heir 
transformation has accompanied -- if n Ol caused -- major shifts in natJomd po liu cs. 
In India. private capital and state governments both gained independence from 
New Delhi, Congress lost its o ld hegemo ny, national government came to be composed 
of shifting coalnio ll s of regio nally-based pttrties, and state Chjef Ministers now compete 
fiercely to attract FD r to their individual states, all o f which has effec[iveil- made each 
" n,e Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International :\etwork (SA PRJN), 
Structural Adjustment: The Policy Roots 0/ Ecollomic Crisis. Poverty alld Ill equality, 
London: Zed Books, 2004. Colin Leys, The Rise and Fall 0/ Development TheOlY . 
Nairobi and Bloomington : EAEP and Indiana University Press, 1996. 
20 Moazzcm Hossain, Iyanutu l Is lam and Reza Kibria. Soulli Asian Economic De\'elopmel1 l: 
Tralls/ormatiolls. Opportunities alld Challenges. London: Routledge, 1999. 
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Indian sta te a distin ct development regim e. In Nepal, electo ral democracy was 
established in 1991, opening development to wide public debate, as foreign investments 
grew, and as a Maoist in surgency also grew, carving the natio n into regions o f war and 
allowing the king to manage a royal coup, purpo rtedly to secure Kathmandu again st 
revolutio n. Sri Lanka has endured civil war since 1981, and the nation that existed in 
1970 has effec tively di sappeared. In Bangladesh, s truggles over development b rough t 
military coups and a popular movement that established dem ocracy in 1991 , amidst a 
deep dependency on international finan ce and trade. In Paki stan , a government wracked 
by struggles for regional auwnomy felt disrup tions from two decades o f war in 
Afghan istan, leadi ng to ma rc stringen t autho ri tarian dependence o n th e US. 
H isto ry in th e Presen t 
Co nrcmpo rary de\' el opmenr regllll es are III fl ux . Dism antling govern ment 
co n tro ls [Q expan d the pri\'ate sec{Or has accompan ied domestic and fo reign demands 
fo r mo re public scru tiny and popular participation to make smte regimes accoun table and 
transparen t 10 citizens and investo rs at home and abroad. A vast reinterpreta tion and 
reorienta tion o f governm ent is occurring. States are o ffi cially intact, and nations remalll 
the basis of developmen t, but natio nal states no lo nger govern devel opment. 
No wonder governance is now such a pro min ent co ncern in develo pmen t 
di sco urse. No coherent set o f ins titu tions has th e power and authority to establish norms 
and en force rules that govern development. 
l-Iow is devel opmen t govern ed today? The question is m o re than conten tious: it 
IS a conundrum , w hich \\'e can analyze historically and spatially. As we have :,cen , 
imperialism es tablished modern development regimes, which redesign ed regIOnal 
economies to serve a wo rld o f markets managed by imperial nation s. The British Empire 
designed terri tories of de\Telopment in South .-\ sia, which natio nalists cap tured and 
redesig ned by di sciplining markets inside independent states. Thus, the spatial framework 
o f develo pment shifted from empire to nation , in the middle decades o f the twen neth 
centu ry. 
In the last twenty years, another shift has occurred. States have lost much o f rheir 
disciplining power over m arkets, and thus their leadership ro le in development. A <:. that 
has occurred. na tional territory has lost its definitive role as the spatial framework that 
determin es who is auth orized to govern development and what people developmen t 
must serve. Territorial boundaries had defined participants, populatio ns, and prio ri tic:, in 
the development process. N ow links between deyelopment and territory arc ambiguous. 
Leaders o f development have diversified, they are scattered all over the world, and their 
bo rder crossing is ubiquitous. 
National states still define official territories of devclopn1ent. but natio nal powers 
to govern de\'e! opment var~' tremendously. In general, these powers decline widl na tional 
wealth un til they reach virtually zero in the world 's poorest coun tries. 
G rowing inequality o f wealth and power among nations is an increasingly vi:,ible 
feature o f rhe development process, but also increasingly invisible in main stream 
devel opment discourse, which treats aU countries as equall~' sovereign territories in [he 
world of globalizatio n. Disproportionate rich country influence is pervasiv e glo bally. in 
government circles. business, finance , technology, international agencies, co nsumensm , 
educatio n , media , fa shion, language, and other realms. ;\ new imperial fo rmation is 
emerging and globalization today has much in common with glo balization a century ago . 
Then there was British Empire, now there is US Empire. 
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Yct imperial authority is gone. In a world of nations, empire cannot provide 
ieglt.imlltc governance. But at the same time, most poor nauonal states CIIn not provide 
effective governance inside their own borders. So who then will govern development? 
Balanced precariously between the rcal power of contemporary imperialism and 
the real authority of national states, in shifting sands of globahzaLion, leadership In 
development today has no clear guidelines of organization. Leaders have disparate 
loyalties and priorities. Their institutions pursue disparate goals. Their relationships wuh 
one another are messy, fi lled with competition, con flict, resi stance, and negotiation 
among old. new, emerging, and aspiring leaders. Tclevi~ion images o f protcsters at \Vorld 
Bank and \VrO mcetings, or of the carnivalesque \X/orld Social Forum raised again ~t 
s taid G-8 meetings, represent only th e visible surface of th e disorderly contestation 
um.lcJ"\va\, In dC\'e!opment regimes today. 
Can Finance Govern? 
The ovcra rching Influence of finance ca pital in dC\'elopment suggests it may no\\-
be dOlTIlnanL Financial Interests take many forms but have In common their ability to 
suborn and dISCIpline the needy. The first order of business In development work toda \ 
is gathering finance, and the power and authority o f finanCial institutions gave grown 
exponentially in the last twcnty years. Thc striking absence of diversity in governmelll 
econ omiC policies in poor countries of the South, and the uniformity of poucy trends and 
economiC problem s fo llo wing structural adjustment, result from the vast power an d 
authOrity of Bretton \'(loods insritutions. 
~lost Internauoml funding agencies have followed \X 'orld Bank leadership when 
uSlllg money to increase th eir influence over de\-elop menr. In lh e age of structu ral 
adjustment, they by-passed national governments and supported d1e rise of Non-
Governmental Organizauons (NGOs), which no\\' play independent leadership roles 
22,000 NGOs operate in Bangladesh, and the largest, BRAe, rivals ministries. Laun ched 
on a small scale in 1976, the Grameen Bank now counts its clients in the millions and 
values Its loans in billions of dollars. Tn India, ]\;GOs employ more people than the 
central government. US1l1g Individual access to financing, and working 1I1dependencly ot 
government, J\"GOs ha\'e effectively scattered goyerna nce in the development proces5= 
among count1ess fragmented geographies and insriruoons, many with s trong in tellectual 
and other links with inrernational agencies, and though grounded 111 speCIfic countri es. 
also ruspersed around the world. 
Funding worth hundreds of billions of dollars circu lates in networks ot" 
development finance, which is wide open for NGO entrepreneurship. Garnering these 
funds no more makes an NGO a mere tool of funding agencies than receiving NGO 
goods and sen -ices makes pawns of \-illage beneticiaries~ and no m o re, mdeed, [han 
laking a bank loan makes a bUSIness a banker's mute instrumenL NGOs ha\-e minds and 
agendas of their own and funding agencies need :.lGOs, as well as go\-ernments, lO 
utilize fllnds effectively and keep the money moving. The growth of NGOs reflects the 
rise of a relatively autonomous leadership sector in development, while state dependence 
o n donors and lenders indicates [hat go\-ernmcnts remain indispensable. 
Immeasurably m o re money moves through business network s, seeking profi ts. 
Numerous multinational corporations control more finance than all develo pment 
agen cies combined . Indeed, it might be said that what goes under the name of 
"development funding" o nly makes sense economically when synchronized with business 
interests. Making places and people attractive for investors now seem s the dominant 
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concern for most development agencies_ From this perspecti\-e, we can see th e \'(torld 
Bank as a conduit for the power and autho rity o f major busllless interests and of irs 
maj or rich country finan ciers. 
Yet finan ciers and busin esses need sustainable sites fo r profitable investment, 
wh ich they canno t creare them selves. However dependent governmen ts and NGOs may 
be on funding agencies that serve profit-makers, businesses rely o n governmen ts, and 
now also o n NGOs, to secure investment environments in natio nal territori es to which 
all th e \'~"o rld's populatio n are variously attached.21 Structural adjustment did not intend to 
demo lish national governments, but rather [Q make them bener serve financial leaders in 
an emerging global developmenr regime, which articulates the power o f m any rich 
countries in au th oritative in ternational institutio ns, including the \":(fork Bank, IMF, UN, 
OEe D, and WTO . 
A Global Regime 
In global development di scourse, each na tional st,He governs its econo m y, and 
each {<developing econom~-" is de\'e!oping itself, in a global context, bur in South Asia 
and elsewhere, national development reg imes can also be unders tood realis tically as 
o rfi cia l1 ~- but not operationally independent terri[Qries in a global regime. Imperial 
histori es underpin that glo bal regime, which includes difference and competitio n as well 
as collabora tio n amo ng its leaders. Yet the integration and coherence of the glo bal 
regime have increased dramatically 111 the last twenty years, under the authority of the 
World Bank and increasing impact 0; globalization . 
.-\ s a result, each country in South Asia no\\' inhabits mo re than one development 
regim e. N ational regimes still opera[e, but each has various local and regional sub-uni ts 
with disrincti\"e rul es of operatio n, ;'I nd each must also abide by imernational rules. In this 
light, we can consider, for ins tance, [he Tuesday Group -- composed of dip lomats fro m 
do nor cou ntries wh o meet each week in Dhaka to make their \\111 known to government 
-- as a part of the Bangladesh regime. US embassy and World Bank offices act like global 
headquan ers in Dhaka. Numerous NGO s and government agencies, such as DFID, 
serve as articulating institutio ns that knit together local, national and global regimes with 
cross-border activities that connect rich and poor capital cities with " target" sites and 
populations throughout Bangladesh. 
Thus, populations served br development regimes are now difficult to delineate 
geograph icall~·. Each country's national citizenry is ostensibly its target population, but 
national regimes mu st please do nors. lenders, investors, and financiers, whose compelling 
interests lie elsewhere as well. Like the leaders o f imperial developmenr in British India, 
con temporary leaders all claim to be serving " the poor." Viceroy Lord C urzon once 
famou slr quipped that he had personally done more fo r India's poor than all the ravi ng 
nationali sts who attacked him. With (his in mind , it is worth consideri ng that programs 
that proclaim thei r goal to be poverty reduction also have other functio ns. Moreover, 
their geographical reach is important today, as national s tates s teadily lose the capacity to 
undertake pO\'erty reduction effecti\'ely o n their own, inside [heir own borders . 
" David Ludden,"Maps in the Mind and the Mobility of Asia," J01/rnal of Asian SlUdies. 62, 
) , November, 200) : 1057- 1078 
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All the major globally active developmen t institutions have now ll.dopted 
Millennium Development Goals (1vIDGs) . This unprecedented common framework for 
policy thought and actio n adds coherence to the global regime, whose leaders seem ro 
::I.grce that national states only serve their own poor peoples adequately by meeung 
uniform targets se t by international agencies. "Targeting the POOf," " listen ing to the 
poor," and " learning from the poor," al so preoccupy NGOs, donors, funding groups, 
and action groups of many kinds. with va rious territorial attachments. "The poor" now 
represent a global population living in countries saddled with MDG performance targets 
under global surveillan ce. Poor people are thus no longer conceived primarily as national 
citizens. They arc targcts , beneficiaries, and participants in a development process 
whercin leadll1g financlcrs, Intellectuals, activis ts, policy makers, and disciplinarians [ra\'c! 
the globe, measuring, monitoring, cajohng, and rewarding state performance according to 
global standtuds rendered acceptable In most countries thro ugh the oper:wo ns of 
intcrnatlonal agencies like [he \\lodd Bank and Unll ed Na tIons . 
A Second G loba lization 
Nationalist preoccupatlon s had guided national regimes durll1g the herday of 
planning, ilnd they still pervade national politics, education, and cultural insD tutions. But 
national economics h::l\'e beco me increaslIlgly (outwardly oriented" in the last twenty 
yea rs, and so have nauo nal cultures. Today's educared youth, the next generation of 
national lcaders, is mo rc ourwardly oricl1[cd every day. This represents a reorientauon of 
national culture with " the opening up" o f national economies to world markets and 
globalizauon generalk 
The techno- regime pro pelling rhls trend includes commullIcations :sys tems thal 
shape national ideologies and politics. Televisio n media owned by multinational 
corporations have flooded public information sys tems in South Asiil , at the same rime as 
natio nal economies have become more exp0 rl oriented and thus mo re sensitive to what 
people see gOing on In rich countries. The import-export reonentation of national 
economies, under the Influence o f global information and communications systems, 
repeats and magnifies glo balization trends a century ago, and ilkewise, accoI11panics 
increaSing domestic investments by rich country businesses . 
In rhe P::lst twenry years, imPOriS IntO countries affected by strucnlral adjustment 
poliCies have grown much faster than exports, s training sta te treasunes, compelling more 
export production, and inducing national needs for more foreign direo investment 
(1001). The growth of exports from South Asian coun tries measu red 13.5% annually 111 
the 1990s, almost four times the rate or the 1970s. FOl also grew rapidly, though II 
remains a small proportion of Sou th Asia 's GOP. In the 1990s, 1001 increased in Inrua, 
Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Pakistan roughly by factors or 50, 30, 10, and 3, respectively. 
Nauonal impOrts, exports, and 1001 forge linkages between national and foreign 
business, which in South ASia rypicall~' subordinates needy domestic business to the 
needs of richer external partners. A global policy orientation turns national territory into 
a collection of strategic sites for geographically dispersed operations by international 
investor networks. Externally o riented governments compete to make their territories 
attraClive fo r investors. Success increases capital resident at least temporally inside their 
borders; it compels government to adju st domestic policies so as to atfrac[ ever more 
external investment and ro hold it as long as possible. 





Dis arti c ulati o n 
Outward national po licy orientation s fragment national terril'O ry sp(ltla!iy into a 
colkcliol1 of p n ll 'llIially prnlit:,bh: ~ il!.:~ ro r bll ~ l lll'~~ investmen t, at (he SIIllle lime as 
development insti mtion s "target" dispara te groups, interests, and issues in the world of 
so-called " developing countries." Women, poor people, indigenous people, the 
environment, health, micro-credit) governance: the li st goes o n and on of specific topics 
o f global development specialization, each with its own set of experts and leading 
institutions . The IWorid DelIClopllll'1I1 l\ eport represen ts an annual co mpilau on of leading 
global issues, to be tackled in each country separately under the discipline of the global 
l'cgll11e. 
Meanwhile, in the world market economy, a repeat of the core trend of the fir st 
globalization -- the creation of speciali zed sites for capital investment and labour control 
-- is well underway. Tn Nepal, rou risr sires and hydro -electric projec ts attract foreign and 
domestIc partnerships. Sn Lanka is a free-trade zone. India is now a collection of 
regional development histories." Bangalo re and H yderabad are growth nodes for global 
high technology business coll aboration. Tn Bangladesh, an urban garment industry has 
been th e fastes t growlI1g employer, prima rily of women, relyi ng o n impo rts of all material 
II1putS and exporting all its output; and specific ru ral sites for shrimp cult ivation, natural 
gas extracuon, nnd coal n11111ng preoccupy development news. Sylher speciali zes in the 
restaurant business in Britain, and in natural gas production, complete with recu rring 
disasters caused by foreign investors who buy rights to national resources at bargain rates 
dictated by national needs for FDr and secured by shady deals with government officials. 
III South r\~ i ;l and elscwhcre, a visible disa rticulati on of national territories is 
occurring today under the combin ed influence of historical processes that include the 
outward reorientatIon of national P OUC1CS, eco nomies, and cul tures; (he localization o f 
econo mic spect:tliz:tuo l1 In wo rld mark ers; the fra gmentMion of group~ and issues for 
Iso lated targeting by development institutions; and the increasing force and coheren ce o f 
the g lobal uevdopmcnt rcgunc. The rcrnLOrial baSIS for development has thu s become 
:1mbiglloliS. 
Any future spatial re-articulation of development regimes along the clear 
territorial lines that gave them such firm coherence in the past seems very unlikely. The 
global development regime is itself ambiguously territorial -- or we might even say, 
hypocritically so -- bccillisc it procbim~ nation:'!l sovereignt y ;ll1d unde rmincs it :1t the 
S(lme ume . 
There is some international movement toward a retcrriorializauon in Asia, but 
SA:\ RC, fo r in:-iI':l!l Ct..', rl'I11:1ill S \vl'~lk, :I!ld the global I'l'g1l1H: undermines strcng thcning. 
Added territorial coherence might be ga ined by cooperation <'lmong co ntigu ous counrries, 
but for the most pan , their governments and businesses compete for shares in world 
markers and squabble over border crossings they ca nn o t control. 
As markets escape states, border-crossi ng eludes regulation and monito ring. 
Cross-bo rder labour migration has reached staggering propo rtions bu t is impossible to 
r l'g\lI :Hl' o r :1%l'% :1('("U 1':11 ely. The b rg t'sl k llown overseas now is (() I he P t:r:-i l:ln Cui f, 
where Bangladesh olone sent 1,600,000 workers in 1995. O nly a fraction of resulting 
rt: l11ll tallcCS arc C\'l:r recorded anu most move through Info rmal channels to finance 
domes ric con~lImpri () n. inVl':-iln1l'nl ~lI1d fo n ·igll trade ill till' ITlIgr:lIlt :-i ' hOl11l' locdily. 
" Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen ed itors . II/ dia l/ Developmel/t : Selected Regiol/al Perspectives. 
Delhi : Oxford University Press, 1998. 
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Illega! trades flourish In drugs and arms; orgal11zcd cnme has gone beyond Its old Interest 
In black markc[ [;lclla:.; and vldc{)~ to trl'lfficklng In W01TH.'l1 and child :-;cx-wo rkcrs. 
f\larkcts wlthollt borders Lhus thrive al the L!X[)L:tlSl' or !I<lUUll,d CCU11U!I11C COhCfI .. :IICC <lilt..! 
political authority. 
Such mobility suggests that much of the citizenry has acquired an ambiguous 
attachment to natiol1<t1 autho rity ~mcl national rerritory. IVfany poor people may be more 
effectively attached to local and regional institutions and to NGOs than to national 
governn1enrs. Aspiring educated urban classes were the historic font of nationalism, but 
their lifestyles and tritJcctOrles also att<lch them now to rich countries where they study, 
work, travel, lllVC:Sl, m;ll'r)" Sl'lHJ children, and emigrate, UrLCI} to returll . Tlw; global 
:ltt:lchmcnl of dl:';U(JCLliatCti mll.klle chsse~ pc rvIllics NCOs, whIch de<ll with 
development problems using Ideas and flJ1:1l1ce that travel the world into natlonal 
localities where they employ suitably trained employees and experts. 
Resistance and Excl usion 
Adding further IIlcoherence to the governance of development, mobile experts 
and acuvists lead Cluzen groups that sharply criticize natio nal and global development 
rcglll1c~ and arc mostly cxcluLieJ from them.;' Popular movcl11cnls agalllst lhc Narmada 
Dam 111 IndIa and Arun Three hydroelectric project in Nepal arc but rwo of cOLlnrie:;s 
efforts to make devdoplllcllt 1110n: rcspcctful of people marginalizcd, displaced, 
excluded, and impoverished by development programs. Such movements typically 
aroculate local grievances WIth national politics as well as with globally active 
orgal1lzaoons. 
Direct resistance (Q the discipline of development regimes also cakes many forms, 
some deemed legitimate, others not. Corrupuon and Criminality can be seen to represent 
illegitimate efforts to free markets in goods and services from regulatory discipline. 
Legitimate "free markets" require l11tense diSCIplIne and Imposing that discipline is today 
a major preoccupation of devclopment rcgll11CS. 
Markets ttre much better ttt serving regimes that operate inside clear domains of 
terntorIal authorlry which delineate legitimately enforced systems of rules for market 
governitnce.:!~ Today's territorial rusmtIculatIon and ambiguous fe-artIculation htts 
generated rich liminal spitce for rt..:Slstance to rules itnd 110rm~ imposed by any rcgime. 
Concentrations of Crime llnd corruption on the external and internal margIns of nat.lonal 
territory -- in ports, on coasts, In rIvers) chars, borderland, and mountaIns, slums and 
poor villages -- excluded from the benefits of development discipline, inciIcate that 
territorial governance requlres not only border controls but also sp;tu;tl integratIon of 
people ;tnd phces in effecllvc instltuflons of resource provisioning. 
Expbcit poliucal oppoSItion adds fu rther ungovernability to development 
regllnes. Countless gra5sroots movements aspire (Q participate in the maInstre:lm. but 
others seck to redeflnc developmenl 111 loc<ll, regional, ethnic, narion:1l, religious, :1nd 
C\'en global terms . Influential struggles l'O inject disenfranchised groups into development 
J.i The Posf-Developmellf Reader, Editors Majid Rahllel11a and Victoria Bawtree. Dhaka : 
University Press Limited, 1997. 
2J As M.D .Young says, "competitive markets a re excellent servants but baclmasters." 
Sustainable Investment and ReSOlirce Use: Equity, Environmentallntegrily, and 
Economic Efficiency Pans: UNESCO and Parthenon Press, 1992. 
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regime::; often face fierce repression and are kep t on the margins of public visibility. Some 
struggles over development straddle distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy, 
because their demands may be legitimate while their strategies and tanics may nO t be, as 
among Maoists in Nepal, Naxalites in India, the LTfE in Sri Lanka, Islamic militallls in 
man y countries, ULFA in Assam, and tribal peoples in mountain regions in India's 
northeast and the Chittagong I-fill Tracts. 
Conc lu sio n 
Contemporary develop ment regimes inhabit hi stories they do nOt contro l. They 
operate among forces and tendencies (hal do not form one dominant trend. 
Globalization, regionalism, and localization are all progressing at the same tim e. In this 
comext, the use of nauonal statistics to measure the progress of devel opment is nOt only 
inadequate but deceptive, because national territories no lo nger comprise rhe spatial 
domain of development. No other territorial domain has come into existence. 
Problenls of governance today thus do not derive from nauonal go\-ernments 
and cannot be addressed realistically by reforms designed to improve national state 
performance as a managerial development in stitution. Governance today is ra ther a 
conundrum locked in place by forces operating in side and outside national terri wries. 
Experts and di sciplinarians who \vork earnestly co enforce rules and norms of the global 
regime in natio nal s tates participate in struggles and negotiations o\-er control o\-er thc 
developmcm process, rather than being dispassionate purveyors of universal truths aboUl 
tra jectories of human progress. 
\\ 'ho is leading devel opment, who is benefiting, and where coday's trends are 
moving remain debatable, Some say development is dead. I t is more accurate CO say that 
development has entered a co nfu sing phase of flux and uncertainty, wherein increasingly 
numerous, \·oGlI, and contentious participants organize to pursue disparate, sometimes 
contradic(Qry goals. including free market globalization, economic growth, gender justice, 
encling pO\Trty, and empowering the poo r majority of citizens who have never ,'et had 
their own effective institutional voice . 
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